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Amid the renewed concern in the last several years about the potential for life science
research to facilitate the spread of disease, a central plank of the policy response has been
to enact processes for assessing the risks and benefits of “research of concern.”The recent
controversy regarding a proposed redaction of work on the modification of a H5N1 avian
influenza virus is perhaps the most prominent such instance. And yet, a noteworthy feature
of this case is its exceptionalness. In the last 10 years, life science publishers, funders, and
labs have rarely identified any research as “of concern,” let alone proposed censors. This
article takes this experience with risk assessment as an invitation for reflection. Reasons
for the low number of instances of concern are related to how the biosecurity dimensions
of the life sciences are identified, how they are described, how the assessments of benefits
and risks are undertaken, how value considerations do and do not enter into assessments,
as well as the lack of information on the outcomes of reviews. This argument builds on
such considerations to examine the limitations and implications of the risk–benefit experi-
ment of concern framing, the politics of expertise as well as the prospects for alternative
responses.
Keywords: rationality, risk–benefit assessment, dual-use research of concern, precaution, biological weapons
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INTRODUCTION
Throughout recorded history, attempts have been made by some
to stop others from acquiring means of inflicting harm. From
sixth century BC, efforts to check the spread of the formula
for Greek fire to twentieth-century efforts to restrict designs for
atomic and nuclear weapons, groups, and nations have exerted
themselves to limit the potential for the diffusion of destructive
capabilities – sometimes with specific users in mind, sometimes
simply to anyone else. Attempts at control have extended far
beyond weaponry itself. In different ways, natural resources, ani-
mals, information, and individuals have been subject to restriction,
sanction, and suppression. Such attempts have been conceived
in response to the hopes, events, fears, and preoccupations of
their times.
Particularly since 9/11 and the subsequent anthrax postal
attacks in the US, research in the life sciences has become an object
of apprehension in relation to who might use it for what purposes.
The question of how to prevent the life sciences from becoming
the death sciences has been posed and answered in ways that raise
questions for longstanding preoccupations and practices. Atten-
tion has extended beyond the access to pathogenic agents to also
include scrutiny of what can be called “information products.” For
instance,a central plank of recent biosecurity-related responses has
been to develop processes for assessing the outputs of experiments.
Much of this attention has been couched in terms of the imper-
ative to weigh risks and benefits of openness. For instance, since
2003 a number of civilian science journals have established proce-
dures for reviewing individual submissions in relation to whether
“the potential harm of publication outweighs the potential societal
benefits” (1).
This and similar activities undertaken by funders, university
departments, and others have prompted wide-ranging discussion,
typically framed in terms of where the balance should be struck
between scientific freedom and national security. Much debate,
sometimes heated, has taken place about the appropriateness of
restricting what research gets done and how it is communicated.
Interestingly, though it is widely acknowledged that almost any
knowledge and techniques in the life sciences can be used for
destructive purposes, in practice it has been rare that risk assess-
ments have identified anything as “of concern”; meaning that it
poses clear possibilities for harm. It has been much rarer still that
the harms of research have been deemed to outweigh its benefits.
This article takes this experience as an invitation to question
how and why this is the case. The argument is divided into six
sections. The next section recounts the recent history of attention
to the security implications of the life sciences, with particular ref-
erence to the identification and assessment of“research of concern”
and related designations. As will be argued, despite the limited
identification of concerns and frequent expression that weighing
the future benefits and risks associated with individual instances
of research is not feasible, the enacting of assessment proce-
dures remains a central strain of current international biosecurity
efforts. The third section then asks how it is that the measures
enacted to spot concerns rarely do so.
The fourth section elaborates on the pervasive but tension-
ridden notions of “rationality” that underpin the assessment of
experiments of concern. The fifth section offers alternative ways
of conceiving of concerns associated with the destruction implica-
tions of the life sciences. These speak to issues about the politics of
expertise. In particular, it will be argued that rethinking the terms
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of the present debate enables new possibilities for understanding
the relation between science and society as well as the place of
precaution in biosecurity.
A RECENT HISTORY OF CONCERN
Regard for the link between the production of knowledge and the
capabilities for inflicting disease has a long history. A recurring
theme of much of the previous century and a half of modern
biology has been the manner in which the latest understanding
of disease fed into state and other biological weapons programs
(2). This section elaborates how such regard has led to the recent
notion that research might be “of concern.”
To begin with, it can be noted that proposals for controlling
intangible knowledge and information did not figure prominently
within Western life science policy discussions in past decades. For
instance, in the years prior to 9/11, many analyses considered the
new destructive possibilities enabled by developments in biology
and related fields (3–5). Proposals for what needed to be done
centered on strengthening physical controls on the transfer of
pathogen agents and who has access to them. In this vein, in the
immediate aftermath of 9/11 and the US anthrax letter attacks,
initial legislative measures (such as the 2001 US PATRIOT Act and
the later Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002) enhanced requirements on the registration,
movement, storage, and use of deemed dangerous bioagents as
well as who could legitimately access them (6). Similar controls
were introduced in a number of other countries.
Of note then, post-9/11, there have been suggestions that the
outcomes of fundamental research might need to be scrutinized
and restrictions imposed because of their security implications. As
an example, in late 2001 the former head of research at SmithKline
Beecham, George Poste, in the role of chair of a US Department
of Defense task force on bioterrorism called on biology to “lose
its innocence” regarding its security sensitivities (7). For him that
meant enacting procedures for vetting, classifying, or otherwise
restricting what research gets done and published. Similarly, at
that time Epstein examined the possible contribution of civilian
science for enabling destructive capabilities. He offered the cate-
gory of “contentious research” to denote “fundamental biological
or biomedical investigations that produce organisms or knowledge
that could have immediate weapons implications, and therefore,
raise questions concerning whether and how that research ought
to be conducted and disseminated” (6).
A prime example of the type of research that raised questions
for both Poste and Epstein was the early 2001 publication detail-
ing how Australian scientists inserted the interleukin-4 gene (IL-4)
into the mousepox virus as part of efforts to devise a contra-
ceptive for rodent populations (8). This manipulation resulted
in a modified mousepox with significant mortality rates for non-
immunized, immunized, and genetically resistant mice. The worry
was that the publication of these results could provide a tech-
nique for enhancing the lethality of other pox viruses, including
smallpox. Like others at the time, both Poste and Epstein also
voiced apprehension that if scientists did not initiate a discus-
sion about what controls might be needed for security sensitive
knowledge, then they risked others imposing draconian measures
on them.
At least in the US, efforts were made during 2001–2003 to set
in place a potential basis for restricting research findings because
of how they might aid bioterrorism. The Homeland Security Act
of 2002 included the requirement that US government agencies
“identify and safeguard homeland security information that is sen-
sitive but unclassified” (9); a provision that was feared would be
applied to basic science. One discussion about the potential for
restricting publications identified likely problems and stipulated
that any system of publication review should have the “support of
the international scientific community, which must perceive that
the security benefits of restricting open publication outweigh the
possible costs to science” (10).
At the time, there was little evidence of such widespread sup-
port. As previously mentioned, in early 2003 an informal group of
32 largely American based journal editors agreed voluntary guide-
lines for reviewing, modifying, and if necessary rejecting research
articles where “the potential harm of publication outweighs the
potential societal benefits.” (1) Yet this enactment went hand in
hand with expressions of apprehension – not least voiced by those
signed up to the guidelines – that security motivated restrictions or
oversight measures might unduly jeopardize the advancement of
science (11–14). A common refrain expressed both by those with
roles in national security agencies and in life science professional
organizations was that security might well be compromised over-
all if the said free exchange of information underpinning research
was hindered (15–18).
What would become arguably the most prominent statement
about the potential for the techniques, methods, and knowledge
generated through life science research to aid destructive purposes
was given in late 2003 by a US National Academies report titled
“Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism” (19). It recom-
mended extending existing (largely self-governance) mechanisms
already in place in the life sciences. In relation to the themes of this
article, one recommendation called for the initiation of a system of
pre-project review for so-called “experiments of concern.” Seven
such categories were specified in the report; this included research
that would:
* demonstrate how to render a vaccine ineffective
* confer resistance to therapeutically useful antibiotics or antiviral
agents
* enhance the virulence of a pathogen or render a non-pathogen
virulent
* increase transmissibility of a pathogen
* alter the host range of a pathogen
* enable the evasion of diagnostic/detection modalities
* enable the weaponization of a biological agent or toxin
It was argued that work that fell in these categories should be
reviewed by existing biosafety and recombinant DNA review pro-
cedures for its security implications. Echoing a theme prevalent
elsewhere, the report recommended this while also noting the
importance of not jeopardizing the norm of open communication
in science.
Through the sorts of initiatives mentioned in the previous
paragraphs emerged a sense of the potential security implications
of the life science research outcomes and the need for oversight
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measures. Those notions largely emanated from the US and they
were directed at discrete instances of research situated at the nexus
of terrorism and biology. In other countries at the time, the“exper-
iments of concern” framing would be varyingly taken up, rejected,
or ignored (20).
In the years after 2001, just how much of a threat was really
posed by research was subject to varying assessments informed
by alternative criteria about what harms mattered as well as what
lessons should be drawn from past history about the likelihood
and severity of bioattacks (21). Despite such differences, calls for
identifying and assessing sensitive knowledge at the time generally
shared a number of features including: the stated need not endan-
ger the benefits of science that are derived from its openness; the
encouragement to scientists to act before controls was placed on
them from elsewhere; and the object of scrutiny being the future
risks and benefits associated with individual experiments.
In relation to the last point, regard was directed at a limited
number of such instances. Besides the previously mentioned IL-4
mousepox research, other prominent experiments were the 2002
publications detailing the successful artificial chemical synthesis
of poliovirus (22) and the comparison of a type of smallpox
and its vaccine that suggested a means of increasing the vaccine’s
lethality (23).
EXPERIENCE WITH ASSESSMENTS
The attempts to identify and assess sensitive knowledge noted
above sought to establish key points at which to make deter-
minations about whether specific instances of research should
go ahead or be communicated; this based on their anticipated
potential future harms and benefits. In the years that followed
the initial articulations of the “experiments of concern,” this man-
ner of framing the security implications of the life sciences would
become more widespread within international policy discussion.
For instance, after the publication of Biotechnology Research in
an Age of Terrorism, a number of similar calls were made to
put in place “harm–benefit” or “risk–benefit”-related reviews of
research, such as the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Life
Science Research: Opportunities and Risks for Public Health and the
American Medical Association’s Guidelines to Prevent Malevolent
Use of Biomedical Research. The British-based Biotechnology and
Biological Sciences Research Council, Medical Research Council,
and Wellcome Trust did adopt review procedures for grant appli-
cations that posed a potential for misuse in 2005 (24). Despite
such developments, little public articulation was given to how such
assessments could be or were being conducted in practice.
Following directly from one of the recommendations of
Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism, in early 2004 in the
National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) was
formed to provide advice on oversight strategies, guidelines, and
education regarding the handling of federally supported “dual-
use” research. Included within its remit was the devising of criteria
for identifying and evaluating the risks and benefits. In 2007 as
part of the document Proposed Framework for the Oversight of
Dual-Use Life Sciences Research, it offered a split between two
kinds of science: “dual-use research” was used “to refer in general
to legitimate life sciences research that has the potential to yield
information that could be misused to threaten public health and
safety and other aspects of national security such as agriculture,
plants, animals, the environment, and material” (25). Since nearly
all science could be used in this manner, NSABB offered another
category of “dual-use research of concern” (DURC). This denoted
“research that, based on current understanding, can be reason-
ably anticipated to provide knowledge, products, or technolo-
gies that could be directly misapplied to pose a threat to public
health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the
environment, or material” (23).
Within the framework envisioned by NSABB, should Principal
Investigators determine that they are conducting DURC research it
would then be subjected to institutional risk review to assess: “the
likelihood that the information might be misused; the potential
impacts of misuse [and] [s]trategies for mitigating the risks that
information from the research could be misused” (26) In this way,
a general framework for the risk assessment of individual research
instances was elaborated.
While the activities of NSABB and others in relation to the
scrutiny of research results have generated public, policy, and eth-
ical discussion about the dangers they pose for science (27–29),
one notable feature of the reviews is how few publications, grant
applications, or project proposals have been identified as posing
concern. Take the time period following the initial articulations
of the category of “experiment of concern.” In a sample of 16,000
manuscripts submitted to the journals of the American Society
for Microbiology after they adopted the 2003 journal publica-
tion guidance, only 3 were subjected to additional biosecurity
peer review. By the end of 2006, the Wellcome Trust reported
having identified three proposals as requiring additional security
scrutiny with none judged to pose an overall concern on balance
(26). Also, a US National Research Council report titled Seeking
Security: Pathogens, Open Access, and Genome Databases argued
against the prospect of being able to identify genomic data with
significant security worries (17). Even in the case of the 2005 pub-
lications related to the sequencing of the 1918 Spanish Flu virus
(30) and its subsequent artificial reconstruction (31), the benefits
were deemed to outweigh possible risks by the journals involved.
It was such experience up until 2007 that lead NSABB to anticipate
“few” cases would fit into the DURC category and therefore that
the initial assessment of experiments by Principal Investigators
should not be time consuming (32).
This overall pattern of finding little of concern has contin-
ued through until today (33). Between 2009 and early 2014, the
Wellcome Trust has flagged only two applications to its funding
committee for scrutiny in relation to their misuse potential, with
both not being funded on the basis of their scientific merit rather
than due to security concerns (David Carr, personal communi-
cation, 12 February 2014). Of the 74,000 biological submissions
to the Nature Publishing Group between 2005 and 2008, only 28
were identified as having a dual-use potential, with none rejected
for this reason (34). The Danish Centre for Biosecurity and Bio-
preparedness has licensed projects in the Denmark that produce
new technologies of a directly weapons potential and has not
identified any cases of DURC publications (John-Erik, personal
communication, 29 January 2014).
Such an overall situation is remarkable within the context of the
multi-billion dollar increase in biodefense research funding in the
US after 2001, much of it supporting civilian research (35). This
massive expansive directed funding toward the type of work that
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would likely be of concern, and yet few such instances have sub-
sequently been identified in practice. The US National Institute of
Allergy and Infectious Diseases of the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) distributed much of the funding for biodefense research.
Its director reportedly indicated that in recent decades, the NIH
has never had an instance in which funded research was retroac-
tively judged as having been funded or published improperly (36,
37). Instead of large number of diverse instances of research being
flagged on a regular basis, since 2003 a limited list of several exper-
iments have come to be repeatedly cited (38), the latest at the time
of writing being the reverse genetics creation and then mutation
of a virus resembling the 1918 Spanish Flu virus (39).
Such experience makes it important to note that while the Pro-
posed Framework for the Oversight of Dual-Use Life Sciences and
other initiatives outlined processes of assessment, they did not
specify in practice how potential future benefits and harms could
be assessed and weighed. At the time, perception of this gap led
to calls for the development of new risk assessment tools, often
couched in terms of the need for objective quantification of the
likelihood and impacts of bioattacks (40, 41). Within the work of
NSABB itself, belief in the prospect of rigorous and value neu-
tral calculations have been made alongside recognitions that the
evaluation of dual-use potential of research inevitably would be
subjective (42).
While in practice, few experiments were being identified as
posing significant security concerns until and after the launch of
the 2007 Proposed Framework for the Oversight of Dual-Use Life
Sciences, this has come alongside contentions that practicing sci-
entists have been largely unaware of the malign applications of
their research. The World Medical Association, the US National
Academies, the British Royal Society, the International Committee
of the Red Cross, the Wellcome Trust, the InterAcademy Panel,
NSABB, the International Council for Science as well as others
have argued that practitioners needed greater education about the
potential dangers associated with their work (43). In theory at
least, the need for such enhanced understanding left open the pos-
sibility that a different pattern of review outcomes might emerge
once individuals possessed the requisite awareness.
Calls for greater education have not been restricted to scientists
though. Another accompanying current of dual-use discussions
has been the repeatedly expressed anxiety about public under-
standing. For instance, over the course of its deliberations the
NSABB Communications Working Group expanded attention
from the time of its creation on the security threats stemming
from research to include the threats to research posed by public
misconceptions (44).
THE EXCEPTIONAL CASE OF H5N1
Between June 2007 and late 2011, NSABB’s Proposed Framework
for the Oversight of Dual-Use Life Sciences faced an uncertain future
waiting for an official response by successive US administrations.
The attention to dual use transformed significantly in late 2011
when a set of experiments on the H5N1 influenza virus became
high profile. At that time, two groups lead by Ron Fouchier at
Erasmus Medical Center and Yoshihiro Kawaoka at the University
of Wisconsin, Madison submitted manuscripts to Science and
Nature respectfully related to the mammalian transmissibility of a
strain of H5N1; specifically indicating how a genetically mutated
form of the H5N1 influenza virus could become transmissibly
airborne between ferrets (45, 46). Up until that time, H5N1 was
only known to be transmittable through direct physical contact.
Although exactly what had been demonstrated would become a
matter of controversy, this work identified a possible casual link
between genetic munitions and airborne transmission between
mammals more generally.
National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity reviewed the
publications and concluded they should go ahead, but minus cer-
tain details so as to reduce their malign potential (47). In the
wide-ranging debate that followed, a year long moratorium was
initiated by a group of 40 flu researchers (48). Both these moves
reignited debates about the security implications of the life sci-
ences – typically framed in terms of whether the freedom of science
should be jeopardized in the name of security. The WHO convened
an international meeting in February 2012 that heard additional
non-public information about the experiments (49). That meet-
ing concluded that full versions of the articles should be published
once issues associated with public messaging had been addressed.
In response to the controversy, in March 2012 the US Department
of Health and Human Services issued a revised policy for DURC
life science research (50).
While this experience with H5N1 has come to dominant recent
discussions associated with the governance of experiments of
concern and spurred renewed attention to implementing review
procedures (51–53), what is perhaps most notable is its exception-
ality. It is exceptional both in relation to the recommendation to
withhold details for security reasons and the extent of policy and
public discussion that took place.
With regard to the former, the recommendation of restricting
details was to be subsequently overturned. In late March 2012,
NSABB was reconvened and reversed its decision in voting overall
in favor of publishing revised forms of both disputed papers. In
justifying this shift, the Board cited the availability of new infor-
mation that reduced worries about the ability of the research
to immediately enable malign capabilities and that increased its
public health benefits (54).
The case of H5N1 is similar to other discussions about experi-
ments of concern though in its fraught relation with risk–benefit
assessment. In reversing its initial decision, for instance, NSABB
contended that “The Board’s discussions were informed by the
analytical frameworks that it previously developed for consider-
ing the risks and benefits associated with the communication of
DURC.” (54) That framework was the 2007 Proposed Framework
for the Oversight of Dual-Use Life Sciences Research: Strategies for
Minimizing the Potential Misuse of Research Information. Yet, as
previously mentioned, this framework did not specify how poten-
tial future benefits and harms could be assessed and weighed in
practice. Instead, it laid out organizational processes for handling
DURC instances.
As another strain of the troubled status of risk–benefit assess-
ment, apprehensions about the way NSABB conducted the assess-
ment of benefits and risks was given in a critical response letter to
the NIH leaked to the press. With regard to one of the controver-
sial papers (subject to a 12–6 split decision in favor of publishing
at the March 2013 NSABB meeting), a Board member lamented:
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I believe there was a bias toward finding a solution that was a
lot less about a robust science- and policy-based risk–benefit
analysis and more about how to get us out of this difficult
situation. I also believe that this same approach in the future
will mean all of us, including life science researchers, journal
editors and government policy makers, will just continue to
“kick the can down the road” without coming to grips with
the very difficult task of managing DURC and the dissemina-
tion of potentially harmful information to those who might
intentionally or unintentionally use that information in a way
that risks public safety (55).
Some commentators would go further, drawing the conclusion
that weighing benefits and risks in relation to DURC issues was
not feasible (56). Yet elsewhere, belief continued to be placed on
the need for “careful consideration of the scope and magnitude of
the potential risks and benefits associated with the research pro-
posal, evaluation of whether the risks outweigh the benefits, and
strategies for mitigating potential risks” (57) – as stated in the
early 2013, NIH guides for US Department of Health and Human
Services’ framework for funding decisions on individual proposals
involving highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses.
International attention to devising processes for identifying
and evaluating research along these lines continue. The need
for DURC-type oversight frameworks has been made elsewhere,
including by some governments as part of the Biological Weapons
Convention (58).
WHY IS THERE NEARLY NOTHING?
For more than a decade, attention has been cast to the poten-
tial destructive application of knowledge generated from life sci-
ence research and what, if any, governance measures need to
be in place to advert their realization. While varying in their
specifics, the attention to what can generically be called “research
of concern” indicates a movement beyond traditional biosecurity
preoccupations about materials, equipment, and personnel.
The previous section though drew attention to some curiosi-
ties: despite the importance often attached to assessing concerns,
in practice few such instances have been identified. Moreover, since
2003 it would appear that (in the end) in no case of civilian for-
mal reviews have the risks been deemed to outweigh benefits. On
the back of this track record, important questions can be asked,
such as: “how is it that so little concern has been identified?,”“how
is belief in the value of assessment processes maintained despite
their apparent lack of implications?,” and “what alternative ways
of understanding are possible?”
This section principally addresses the first of these questions. It
does so by examining the identification and weighing benefits and
harms in order to suggest why cases have not been identified.
WHAT ARE THE OBJECTS OF CONCERN?
Consider first the basic framing given to what is of concern.
Whatever their other differences, the varied attempts to establish
research of concern have generally shared the bounding of evalua-
tions around specific instances of research. Both within assessment
procedures and educational material (59), this means attention
gets cast at individual (or in some cases more than one closely
related) research applications, experiment proposals, and submit-
ted manuscripts. Such instances are envisioned as the holders of
potentially sensitive knowledge.
With such a focus, signaling out one piece of knowledge as of
concern requires being able to separate out its contribution to the
general stock of knowledge from all others. As scientific and tech-
nical developments are typically cumulative accomplishes, this is
often difficult. Against past attempts to contend that a particular
set of findings raised concern, counter claims have been made that
previous work was suggestive of or already indicated grounds for
concerns (60–62). The less a distinctive break from what was pre-
viously known, the more difficult it becomes to justify any security
apprehension.
In contrast, rarely in policy discussions to date have assessments
been offered at lines or programs of work (63). Taking these as the
object for scrutiny though arguably opens up a space for wider
set of questions and possibilities. For instance, the publications in
2005 pertaining to the sequencing of the 1918 Spanish Flu virus
and its artificial reconstruction were only the end culmination of a
long line of funded and published research (64). As a result, it was
possible to scrutinize the activities associated with the 2005 publi-
cations well before the results were sent to in Science and Nature.
Instead of asking “should this particular experiment go ahead or
be published?” alternative broader questions could include “what
lines of research should be funded in the first place?” The latter is
important to acknowledge because in situations of limited fund-
ing, choices are inevitably made about, which research to support
and which to not (65). As such, when a WHO report on its 2013
DURC meeting stated:
Scientific research is conducted in virtually all countries and is
critical to strengthening global response to all health threats
and hazards, including those posed by naturally occurring
and by accidentally or intentionally released biological agents.
The only way to eliminate the potential for misuse of DURC is
to not perform research. Such an extreme solution, however,
is neither feasible nor advisable (66).
It arguably did not make a room for acknowledging that choices
are routinely made to back some lines of research over others (65).
For all the roads taken, there are many not pursued.
The limiting of attention to individual experiments or pub-
lications is also consequential for the identification of concerns
because it generally directs attention toward the latest, and thereby
often most technically sophisticated, expensive and thereby exclu-
sive research. Because of this sophistication, doubts can be raised
about how feasible that it is that other groups can reproduce the
work (67). The resulting situation is one much more difficult to
assess than if consideration were directed at what capabilities are
becoming widely accessible.
HOW ARE CONCERNS IDENTIFIED?
Working within the common conceptualization of individual
instances of research being the potential holders of concern, fur-
ther questions can be asked of the assessment procedures and
practices enacted to date.
As previously noted, a variety of organizations have under-
scored the importance of practicing scientists being cognizant of
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the destructive potential of their activities. Without this awareness,
assessment procedures reliant on Principal Investigators to iden-
tify concerns could not function as envisioned. Against this need
though, many empirical studies have indicated such an awareness
is possessed by relatively few practitioners (68). Thus, the relative
infrequency of the identification might be attributed to a lack of
awareness. This consideration along with the conflict of interest
associated with researchers judging their own work led the Center
for International and Security Studies at Maryland to forward an
oversight system that requires independent peer review to include
those with scientific and security expertise (69).
The contingencies associated with how research is and is not
identified as posing concern can be highlighted through examin-
ing the regard given to the potential of research both before and
after periods of prominent attention. For instance, in the case of
the early 2001 IL-4 mousepox publication, the Australian scien-
tists involved have argued that work undertaken prior to 2001 by
others and in follow-on work they performed after 2001 indicated
how to enhance the lethality of viruses (70). Yet, professional and
public regard for those developments has been muted.
Other grounds can be offered for suggesting formal reviews
might be limited in how they determine concern. The compar-
ison between formal reviews and informal practice is one such
basis. In a 2007 survey undertaken by the US National Research
Council and the American Association for the Advancement of
Science (AAAS), AAAS members with an interest in the life sci-
ences were asked about their familiarity and experiences associated
with dual use. Nearly one in six indicated they had made some sort
of change to their research – for instance, whether it was under-
taken, with whom, and how it was communicated – because of
worries that the knowledge, tools, or techniques might be used
in bioterrorism. The low response rate (16% completed the sur-
vey in full) means the findings were not statistical representative.
However, they signal a level of regard not being registered through
the formal assessment procedures enacted by published, funders
or organizations (71). The criteria individuals employ in making
self-determinations about the potential of their work would be a
likely important topic for understanding rates of identification.
A relatively prominent recent case of researcher-initiated
restrictions was the publication in 2013 of a new type of botulinum
neurotoxin designated as BoNT/H (72, 73). With no effective
treatment for this form of botulism, the researchers decided to
withhold the sequence data on BoNT/H from their write-up of the
research until an antitoxin is developed. In this case, the authors
first consulted with various US federal government agencies about
the advisability of publishing these and then secured agreement
from the journal to publish without the sequence data or their
submission to the International Nucleotide Sequence Databases
(74, 75).
HOW ARE RISKS AND BENEFITS DETERMINED?
Even when concerns are recognized, determining the risks and
benefits has proven highly taxing and would likely be so into the
future.
One challenge is that assessments of risks and benefits vary
considerable. For instance, based on lab observation research and
interviews, Bezuidenhout has argued distinct ways of making
sense of risks and benefits exist between scientists in sub-Sahara
Africa and those prevalent in Western dual-use discussions to date
(76). Within the former, dual-use risks were regarded as hypo-
thetical, biosecurity harms were frequently defined in relation to
gross lab deficiencies in local waste disposal, and the benefits of
research were associated with its ability to address disease in the
immediate term.
Another often identified challenge is the inability of the many
of those associated with the life sciences to assess the potential
for malign applications. In classic risk assessment models, the
expected value of risk is taken as a function of the likely prob-
ability of an event times its consequences. In relation to formal
reviews for research of concern, given how the objects of concern
are typically defined, what is demanded then is a way of assessing
the possibility that unspecified users would draw on individual
sets of findings toward the development of an unfixed range of
destructive capability in a time frame that is not specified. Then
assessors need to determine the expected consequences of such
an action against likely available countermeasures. A fully devel-
oped notion of threat would also require regard for the intent of
potential users.
As many have contended, practicing scientists are often not
knowledgeable about the capabilities or intent of those that might
employ their work for hostile ends (6, 70). The same has been
argued for those that typically make up biosafety committees in
universities and elsewhere (56). In this regard, it should be under-
scored that what is required for assessing dual use is twofold: one,
information about matters such as motivations and capabilities
and two, a competency through methods, concepts, and theories
to assess experiments (77).
The extent to which either dimensions can be grasped at all in
the case of dual-use life science research appears an open ques-
tion. Just how much information is available and could be made
widely accessible about the motivations and capabilities of would-
be users is unclear; especially given the relative dearth of bioattacks
in recent years that might provide a (however tentative) baseline
for future extrapolation (78, 79), the clandestine status of any
existing state or sub-state bioweapon programs, and the focus in
reviews given to cutting edge capabilities enabled by the latest
science.
In addition, though, despite the aforementioned importance
often attributed to devising methods for determining the secu-
rity risks associated with research of concern, little by the way of
detail have been given about how this could take place (69, 80).
The absence of methods for determining risks is a particularly
salient point in relation trying to make sense of concerns outside
of traditional agents used within biowarfare programs.
As such, much of the consideration of research of concern could
be characterized as taking place in conditions of “ignorance” – that
is in conditions characterized by limitations in both information
and methods for assessment (77).
Yet, a further sense of the difficulties of determining risks is evi-
denced in how security related implications should be interpreted.
To start, as has been repeatedly argued in relation to the DURC
designation developed in the US, “characterization of research
as DURC should not be viewed pejoratively” (81), meaning it
need not necessarily be stopped, censored, or otherwise restricted
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because it is determined to be “of concern.” But questions of inter-
pretation go beyond this point of a non-negative evaluation. The
identification of concern has heighted the positive value attached
to research because of what it suggests for assessing threats and
countermeasures (82, 83). A notable feature of many of the exper-
iments of concerns of the last decade is how the initial work led to
follow-on activities undertaken worldwide and justified on both
scientific and biodefensive grounds. The identification of the need
for such follow-on work has led some to express anxiety about the
risks to society from restricting dual-use information (84).
Whereas the downside potential of research is widely regarded
as difficult to assess and often subject to radically diverging eval-
uations, the contention that benefits can be expected to accrue
(however, much in the future, however, indirectly) is a starting
point for many commentaries (80). In short, research is categori-
cally taken as “an essential public good” (85). While the certainty
or even likelihood of research leading to health improvements has
been queried elsewhere, such doubts are rarely voiced within dual-
use discussions (86). The case of H5N1 was a notable exception
in the manner in which detailed questions were raised about its
utility (87).
HOW ARE RISKS AND BENEFITS WEIGHED?
In classical risk assessment models, once risks and benefits are
identified, these should be weighed against each other so that a
net assessment can be reached. In the case of research of concern,
for instance, this is expressed in the manner some publishers have
committed themselves to assessing whether “the potential harm of
publication outweighs the potential societal benefits” (1). Given
the “ignorance” that often characterizes determinations of dual-
use risks though, undertaking such a weighing has and will likely
be bedeviled by problems.
In theory at least, such a situation could lead to a range of pos-
sible outcomes. For instance, post-9/11 in the US [and elsewhere
(88)], fears about low probability but high-consequence terror-
ist attacks justified a range of domestic anti-terrorism measures
and military actions (77). Parallel uncertainties and unknowns in
relation to research of concern could have resulted in sweeping
restrictions. This, however, has not taken place.
What explains this difference between the types of responses
made in previous years? One set of considerations would seem
to be the basic presumptions informing weighing. For instance,
as mentioned above the default position has been that risks with
research of concern need to be substantiated, whereas the benefits
from research are typically assumed (41). Another prominent set
of presumptions is that life science research – in the absence of
security related controls – is characterized by the free and open
flow of information, that such a situation is vital for the scien-
tific progress, and that therefore any attempt to move away from
this default needs to be justified (80). A related corollary is that
once knowledge has been generated, it is not possible to undo it or
restrict its flow (89). With such widespread presumptions, controls
are difficult to justify.
Both lines of thinking are arguably questionable though. Social
studies of the practice of science have indicated how the exchange
of information in research is frequently subject to negotiation and
limitation in practice – not least because of commercialization
goals (90). In addition, to subscribe to the view that knowl-
edge once generated is simply “out” and uncontainable relies on
a reduction of knowledge to abstract and explicit propositional
statements. In contrast, it is possible to highlight the practical
skills, understandings, and competencies necessary to reproduce
and utilize specific research. These ways of knowing are crucial to
many aspects of the production of biological and nuclear weapons
and, as such, some scope exists to affect (and even reverse over
time) the proliferation of capabilities (91).
As Buchanan and Kelley argue though, the very attempt to
pitch risks and benefits against each other and ask how they can
be “traded off” is consequential. Such an approach often discounts
what does not fit under the heading of “open science”or“security.”
As they argue, within the typical dual-use framing:
. . .it is the interests of only two parties that are likely to
be strongly represented: scientists who fear constraints on
the pursuit of knowledge, and government officials whose
worst nightmare is a bioterrorist attack that could have been
prevented. Therefore, one of the dangers of an overly sim-
plistic framing of the ethics of biodefense is that it largely
ignores or arbitrarily discounts values that have been central
to the research ethics debate since its inception: the pro-
tection of research subjects, both human and non-human
[i.e., animal] (92)
With this silencing, weighing is likely to be skewed.
This formulation of the limitations of dominant framings today
itself though arguably makes questionable presumptions. As with
much of the discussion about biosecurity generally and research of
concern specifically, Buchanan and Kelley treat the issues at stake
as subject to contention by two competing communities with dis-
tinct interests: those on the side of “science” and those on the
side of “security” (93). It is the latter “security community” that
is treated as seeking restrictions on what research gets done and
how it is communicated. Appeals to such a community have been
routinely evoked in dual-use discussions, though without defining
its membership.
In practice, it is difficult to identify a coherent security com-
munity in relation to the specific topic of “research of concern,”
let alone one that has worked in a concerted effort to imposing
restrictions. This is the case both outside of the US (where, in
general, dual-use concerns have been more muted and biosecurity
expertise within national security communities is more limited)
as well as in the US. Indeed, some of those raising the most signif-
icant worries about threats to science have been those that would
likely be identified as part of “the security community” (89). In
the absence of a coherent group consistently forwarding security-
inspired restrictions, the track record of the last 10 years is not
surprising.
HOW HAS EXPERIENCE BEEN EVALUATED?
In models for managing risk, much emphasis is often placed on
scrutinizing experience and modifying assessments in response.
As with the aforementioned components, here too points can be
suggested about why there has been little research of concern.
One pertinent point is the lack of systematic data on how often
experiments and publications of concern have been identified and
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the decisions reached as part of formal reviews. While some figures
have been made available at meetings or in publications, and some
analysts have complied information (33), the resulting picture of
practice has been fragmentary and partial. Such a situation stifles
learning from experience.
In this respect, an interesting feature of the discussion about
this topic is how experience to date is often not taken as relevant to
informing policy recommendations. For instance, in an otherwise
wide-ranging and empirically rich analysis of the dual-use policies
of biomedical journals, Resnik and colleagues lamented on the low
rate of journals with such policies in place (94). To correct for this,
they called for journals to develop such policies. Yet, this analysis
did not seek to determine the implications (if any) of the reviews
undertaken and thereby their practical relevance (95). Instead, the
utility of reviews was assumed. In general, a lack of evidence about
the results of reviews undertaken characterizes other prominent
statements on this topic (63).
At least in relation to US federally funded research, the absence
of information may change. In March 2012, the Federal govern-
ment issued a policy titled “United States Government Policy for
Oversight of Life Sciences Dual-Use Research of Concern.” It
calls for a “regular review of United States Government funded
or conducted research with certain high-consequence pathogens
and toxins for its potential to be DURC in order to: (a) mitigate
risks where appropriate; and (b) collect information needed to
inform the development of an updated policy, as needed, for the
oversight of DURC.” (96). Figures compiled by the NIH in early
2012 indicated 381 extramural and 404 intramural projects using
high-consequence pathogens or toxins. Ten of the extramural
projects and none of the intramural projects were designated as
DURC (97). At the time of writing, however, it is unclear what
information agencies in the US will release on the outcomes of
reviews.
ASSESSMENT AND RATIONALITY
Taken together, the previous sections suggested recent discussions
about research of concern have been tension-ridden. On the one
hand, much of the attention to this topic has been initiated in
response to individual experiments, yet that object of scrutiny also
delimits the scope for consideration. While a handful of instances
of contentious research have served as prompts for wide-ranging
calls to rethink the oversight of the life sciences, few other such
examples have been identified and it has been exceedingly rare that
risks have been deemed to outweigh benefits. Vocal, resolute, and
repeated apprehension has been expressed about how security-
initiated reviews threaten the scientific enterprise, and yet to date
formal reviews have had seemingly little bearing on what activity
gets done or how it is communicated.
Despite the divergent ways of making sense of whether and
what kind of concern should be associated with the informa-
tional products of research, much of the discussion shares a
common object for scrutiny and a common language for thinking
about assessing concern: namely, a focus on weighing the future
benefits and risks of individual elements of research. An often
recurring assertion has been that the extent of concern can be
rendered known, and thereby manageable, through rationalistic
“risk–benefit” assessment procedures.
At times, highly ambitious goals have been ascribed to
assessments. A 2009 Royal Society workshop report titled New
Approaches to Biological Risk Assessment, for instance, suggested
dual-use risk assessments need “to link epidemiological model-
ing of disease, economic modeling, and qualitative social science
modeling of human behavior” (98). Moreover, it added, “public
perceptions and media reactions play an important role in dri-
ving policymakers” decisions on biological risks, particularly in
the context of risk management and communication. Therefore,
any risk assessment methodology needs to encompass assessment
of human behavior and motivations, and any model needs to
incorporate feedback loops to address the public’s reaction to
government risk management policies” (98). Achieving such aspi-
rations for comprehensive rigor was said to require national and
international harmonization through multidisciplinary analysis, a
point echoed elsewhere (99).
The stating of such ambitions have sometimes gone hand in
hand with recognition that doing so in practice would be frustrated
by the demands of determining the risks associated with biological
attacks. At times, these difficulties have been presented as surpass-
able through re-doubling efforts. For instance, in response to the
recognition of uncertainty, the Royal Society’s New Approaches
to Biological Risk Assessment advocated that “given the different
nature of the risks across the spectrum and varying availability of
data against which to derive or test mathematical models, a com-
mon approach should incorporate a range of specific assessments
at points on the spectrum coupled with an overarching model to
unify the resultant risk assessments” (100).
On other occasions, a more fraught relation between expec-
tations and demands has been presented. In 2013, an interna-
tional meeting of prominent government officials, practicing sci-
entists, law enforcement officials, life science representatives, and
others met at Wilton Park for a meeting titled “Dual-Use Biol-
ogy: How to Balance Open Science with Security.” The outcome
report of that meeting displays a desire, necessity, and possi-
bility of definitive measures of risk and benefits as well as the
challenges of producing them. With regard to the former, it was
argued that:
Appropriate risk assessment should be part of the first phase
of the research. Much work needs to be done to identify
appropriate risk assessment factors relevant to DURC, tak-
ing into account the wide range of possible security con-
cerns. In the future, a broader approach to risk could assess
physical safety; economic security costs; diplomatic secu-
rity; social and political stability; fear and anger and risk of
research leading to the diminishing trust in government. It
should also look at probability and take into account possible
actors motives as well as intelligence on terrorist actors. Cur-
rent DURC risk assessments have been largely “risk–benefit”
analyses, and there is a need for much more comprehensive
and quantitative risk assessments that specifically evaluate
what could go wrong with certain research. The assessment
should not be left solely to researchers and we need to incor-
porate all bodies and have a debate including governments
which are responsible for crisis management and therefore
need to consider responses (63).
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And yet, while it was stated that “quantitative assessment sounds
attractive because it feels evidence-based and hence more depend-
able and less open to counter-argument” (9), the Wilton Park
report also noted that“the chances are that firm statistical data will
be hard to come by, and that the sort of risks inherent in dual-use
biological research cannot be quantified easily (which is not to say
that they cannot be quantified at all)” (9). It was further contended
that there is no“common understanding on how to conduct sound
risk/benefit analysis; this is an issue between different states but
also between different communities (scientific, security, etc.)” (7).
Though varying in their portrayal of the likelihood of achiev-
ing it, aspirations for comprehensive risk assessment methods have
been made for years – this despite the lack of progress in that time
toward specifying how risk–benefit analysis of research of concern
could take place in practice. On this last point, the Wilton Park
report contended that between “2005 and 2011 the NSABB estab-
lished a risk/benefit methodology”; (3) a statement, which appears
to conflate the process for the handling of risks and benefits with
a methodology for determining risks and benefits.
Academic analysis of the prospects for risk–benefit assessment
shares many of the same dynamics in treating research of concern
as (more or less) susceptible to rational (often quantitative) analy-
sis, but in practice being able to offer a limited articulation of how
such assessment could be conducted (101, 102).
The need and prospect for elaborated formal risk–benefit
assessment as a basis for decision making is not universally
shared. Interviews undertaken by the author with one national
biodefense establishment, for instance, indicated a preference for
processes of dialog and professional judgment to identify concerns
in contrast to the type of comprehension quantitative analysis
sought elsewhere. The latter was judged as not necessary and not
feasible.
Thus, the points above would suggest the continuing value
placed with assessment processes has been promissory – the
future promise of comprehensive assessments have been widely
forwarded without explicit consideration of the ongoing inability
to articulate how determinations of risk assessment could be made
along the lines advocated (103). Such calls have shored up at least
the prospect of the rational management of the dual-use concerns
and thereby worked against arguments for rethinking the basic
rationalistic framing of debates.
In contrast, this article has also offered reasons for questioning
the prospect for achieving the types of comprehensive assessments
envisioned. Arguably the situation is not simply one of uncer-
tainty about the details of certain parameters associated with the
type and extent of misuse risk nor is it the case that is only diffi-
cult to describe the likely outcomes of the malign application of
research. Rather in many cases, both probabilities and outcomes
are characterized by many unknowns and subject to different inter-
pretations in such a way as to confound the devising of methods
of assessment. If this appraisal is correct then it is necessary to
foster other ways of understanding in order not to prematurely
close down thinking. It is also necessary not to lend a false con-
fidence to what is being grasped by existing review processes. For
instance, the listing of funder and publisher review procedures has
been forwarded at times as grounds for assurance about the level
of scrutiny today (104). Whether that implication is warranted
seems open to question given the argument above that the details
about how assessments are being made makes it highly unlikely
that expected risks would ever outweigh anticipated benefits.
ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES
In recent decades, considerable effort has gone into asking how
risks associated with science and technology can be handled more
generally. A recurring theme from such investigation has been the
need to recognize the fact that risk–benefit assessments are often of
limited applicability in making decisions. When the outcomes and
probabilities can be straightforwardly and consensually character-
ized, such methods can play a significant role in risk management.
In the absence of such conditions though, reducing decision mak-
ing to conventional risk–benefit analysis should not be seen as
rational or reassuring (105).
In relation to the specific topic of this article, how then might
we move away from the narrow question of whether this or that
particular instance of science will likely result in more risks than
benefits? One manner in which this has been done is by asking
about the place of “precaution” in making sense of issues. The
remainder of this paper considers what space can be opened up
through taking inspiration from this topic.
While diverse in their formulations (see below), efforts to inject
precaution into science and technology policy have usually shared
the premise that definitive evidence of negative consequences
need not be demonstrated to justify deliberation or even action
(106). Instead, attempts have been made to ask what uncertain-
ties, unknowns, and ignorances imply for who has to prove what
to whom and for what purpose.
Precaution has become an overarching principle in national
and international regulations such as the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety, the Rio Conference on Environment and Development,
and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer. And yet, despite the widespread reference to “the precau-
tionary principle,” especially in environmental policy, the practical
relevance of these types of orientations is disputed (107, 108).
Within biosecurity life science discussions, precautionary ori-
entations to risk have been dismissed at times. As argued, for
instance:
Using an alternative method such as the precautionary
approach to try to overcome these problems would be quite
inappropriate for governing dual use technologies. Although
the precautionary approach casts a wide net, precautionary
regulations over every potential technology that could be mis-
used would be not only prove to be infeasible in the case of
dual use research and technologies but may have a dramatic
social costs through stigmatizing the legitimate applications
of these technologies (109).
Despite what is implied in such an evaluation, precautionary ways
of orientating to risk are diverse. Peterson spoke of this diversity
in considering how these approaches differed in their answers to
the questions:
• What level (threshold) of threat or potential for harm is sufficient
to trigger application of the principle?
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• Are the potential threats balanced against other considera-
tions, such as costs or non-economic factors, in deciding what
precautionary measures to implement?
• Does the principle impose a positive obligation to act or simply
permit action?
• Where does the burden of proof rest to show the existence or
absence of risk of harm?
• Is liability for environmental harm assigned and, if so, who bears
liability? (110)
As implied by these questions, formulations of precaution still
depend on the identification of risk, but they need not invest
risk–benefit assessments with the definitiveness that is implied
in dual-use discussions today.
Other attempts to map the range of precautionary orientations
have set out taxonomies (111, 112). Luján and Todt, for instance,
distinguish versions of precautionary principles according to how
they handle scientific uncertainty about consequences, make judg-
ments in relation to disputed harmful consequences, and view the
controllability of technology (113). With these criteria, Luján and
Todt offer three different interpretations.
* Under the “Risk-based Interpretation” the need for precaution
enters when there is a credible basis for significant negative con-
sequences, but a lack of scientific certainty about whether they
will likely result. As such, precaution is a supplement to attempts
to regulate through traditional forms of risk management.
* In the “Epistemological Limits Interpretation,” much more
scope is given to the possibility of uncertainty or ignorance.
Rather than ideally being able to be eliminated, they are treated
as often prevalent and irresolvable. As such, decision making
needs to make use of, but also go beyond, traditional risk assess-
ment. That might entail, for example, not simply attempting to
assess risks on a case-by-case basis, but instead adopting cate-
gorical orientations to classes of science and technology. Within
the Epistemological Limits Interpretation, it is essential to learn
as much as possible about (i) the presumptions guiding inter-
pretations of risk where there is uncertainty and ignorance in
order to make them a topic of consideration and (ii) the lim-
its of science in order to ask if non-traditional methodologies
might offer useful ways of handling risks. Through such actions,
expectations about who has to prove what and to what standard
might need to change.
* Finally, as part the “Technology Selection Interpretation,” pre-
caution stands opposed to traditional forms of risk assessment.
Typically within such orientations, categorical evaluations about
the benefits and dangers of certain technologies are made (e.g.,
GM crops), and then the promotion or prohibition of whole
trajectories of activities based on their risks or, even, lack of
data about risks. Such sweeping decisions can be taken either
to avoid the possibility of negative consequences or to promote
positive social goals (such as sustainability).
Against this taxonomy, it is possible to suggest how dual-use
discussions to date are already (albeit mainly implicitly) infused
with precautionary-type reasoning. For instance, as argued previ-
ously, discussions about how to assess research of concern often
start with presumptions – such as that dual-use risks need to be
substantiated, whereas, in general benefits from research can be
assumed – that shape assessments of what needs doing.
Alternative starting presumptions have been voiced elsewhere.
In relation to the H5N1 controversy, two new former members of
NSABB, Michael Osterholm and David Relman, contended that
the risks at stake were so grave (catastrophic human pandemic)
and benefits unclear, that “the precautionary principle” should be
evoked to err on the side of not doing harm – meaning that the
work led by Fouchier needed to be censored (114).
Another precautionary paralleled facet of responses has been
the opting of categorical approaches requiring specific logics of
decision making rather than case-by-case assessments. A Frame-
work for Guiding U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Funding Decisions about Research Proposals with the Potential for
Generating Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 Viruses that
are Transmissible among Mammals by Respiratory Droplets, for
instance, stipulates that there is a category of research that is dif-
ferent from others (115). Within the US Department of Health
and Human Services, funding proposals that fall into this category
must undergo review scrutiny wherein the work must meet cer-
tain criteria (such as that there is no feasible alternative method
to address the same scientific question in a manner that poses
less risk and that the information generated is anticipated to be
broadly shared in order to advance global health).
FROM DECISIONS TO PROCESSES
Up until this point in this article, precaution largely has been con-
ceived as a factor in decision making. Precaution as a decision rule
that prescribes action, however, is only one (and perhaps a highly)
limited conceptualization of the notion. In practice, precautionary
orientations to risk enacted to date have rarely provided definitive
operational rules for making decisions or even stipulated clear cut
criteria. Instead of being a rule for decision making, precaution can
be thought about for what is implied for the process of deliberating
risks. Consider a number of dimensions to this.
Examining foundations
With the acknowledgment given to uncertainties, ambiguities, and
ignorances, attention should be directed at the starting points that
shape understanding. These should be made explicit and a topic
for reflection. In other words, the values underpinning interpreta-
tions to risks must be acknowledged and scrutinized. These may,
for instance, have significant implications for how the burden of
proof is distributed (105). In this sense, making scope for pre-
caution itself does not imply that specific concerns take priority
(for instance, preserving scientific development, environmental
sustainability, avoiding a catastrophic pandemic, etc.), merely that
the (likely varied and multiple) commitments for making sense
of uncertainties, ambiguities, and ignorances be the subject of
examination (116).
Shifting discussion terms
In fostering certain kinds of deliberation, precautionary-inspired
deliberations can lend credibility and legitimacy to some argu-
ments. In relation to how references to the precautionary princi-
ple entered into deliberations about conservation in fishing, for
instance, it has been argued that the effects have been significant:
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first by enhancing the credibility of certain types of argu-
ments and diminishing that of others; second, by providing
a framework within which conservationist arguments can
be presented; and third, by pointing to interests and values
other than those of states as legitimate objectives which the
conservation regime should pursue (117).
Elsewhere precaution has diminished the credibility of narrow,
notionally “scientific” forms of determining risks (108).
The need to reconsider the relevancy expertise in the process
of making sense of the malign applications of science was given in
an examination by Vogel of how US intelligence analysts assessed
the H5N1 experiments (118). Her conclusions were three-fold:
First, U.S. intelligence analysts do not have adequate social
and material resources to identify and evaluate the tacit
knowledge, or know-how, that underpins dual-use experi-
ments such as those in the H5N1 case. Second, they lack
dedicated structures and methods to sort through the politics
that characterize the use of technical expertise in such con-
troversial biosecurity issues. Third, they require new types,
structures, and assessments of expert knowledge to enable
them to make more informed and balanced judgments of
biosecurity threats (48, 80).
As part of enacting these recommendations, she contended that
intelligence analysts need to be able to draw on a wider range of
experts, including those in the social sciences.
Promotion of alternative methodologies
In maintaining the applicability of traditional forms of risk assess-
ment are limited due to uncertainties, ambiguities, and ignorances,
those adopting precaution orientations have sought alternative
methods for making sense of risk. These have been either replaced
or complement conventional assessments (105). Examples include
scenario analysis, interval analysis, Q-method, horizon scanning,
and societal impact assessment (119). Whereas conventional risks
assessment might be done with the aim of weighing risks and
benefits so as to make decisions, methods based on the recogni-
tion of incertitude aim to understand the limits of what is known,
aid professional judgments, identify starting assumptions, reframe
debates, and promote dialog and interaction. Making use of such
methods can result in the participation of a different range of
individuals than conventional risk assessment. Along these lines,
as part of the analysis of H5N1, Vogel suggested how intelligence
analysis could benefit from new forms of engagement that tested
its limitations (118).
One area where these dimensions of precaution come together
is public engagement. Within precautionary orientations, the over-
all attention to the limits of scientific certitude in determining
risks and their acceptability opens a space for a wide range of
contributions; including by those in publics. As argued, though:
“broadening out” of the social appraisal of technology that
precaution may also be seen to entail a more generally com-
prehensive approach to decision making. A key consideration
here concerns the many ways in which precaution is inher-
ently interlinked with participatory approaches. This is not
only as an aspiration to enhanced democracy. Nor is it just
about fostering greater public trust or education. Far from
second-guessing technical expertise with irrational public
anxieties, precautionary participation is a matter of improved
analytical rigor (emphasis in original) (105)
It would be difficult to over-estimate how much of the dual-use
discussion to date has cast the public as a threat to science due
to the potential for “misunderstanding” and sensationalism. As
detailed elsewhere, within the Communication Working Group of
NSABB,“the public” has come to occupy a central (if not the most
prominent) place due to fears of public misunderstanding and sen-
sationalism (120). In response to fears about the public, advisory
documents such as NSABB”s Proposed Framework for the Over-
sight of Dual-Use Life Sciences Research: Strategies for Minimizing
the Potential Misuse of Research Information provide many points
about the need to message the publication of dual-use research so
as to highlight the safeguards on research and its benefits.
Elsewhere in science policy over the last two decades, attempts
have been made to recast the public away from being a problem
for the acceptance of science and technology. Instead, efforts have
been made to promote the engagement of the varied and numer-
ous publics within a dialog (121). Public participation has been
sought, for instance, as a means to highlight the importance of
social values, to challenge technocratic framings, to identify alter-
native paths for the development of technology, and to promote
what is coined as “responsible innovation” (122). While realizing
such aspirations in practice is highly demanding, a more positive
and arguably more productive role for the public is envisioned
within them that typifies dual-use discussions to date (123).
CONCLUSION
This article has examined the origins, emergence, resurrection, and
implications of the category “research of concern.” Throughout,
attention has been given to a curiosity: the rarity that anything is
identified as “of concern.” The previous argument would suggest
that the outcomes of review procedures enacted to date are the
result of contingent practices that are consequential in the man-
ner they structure a sense of what is going on and why, as well as
what needs doing and by whom. In theory, this situation leaves
open the possibility that a different pattern of review outcomes
might take place if alternative conditions are in place.
More critically, as part of making the case for contingency, the
preceding argument has questioned the continuing prominence
given to conventional rationalistic “risk–benefit” assessment in
managing the dual-use dimension of the life sciences. The notion
of “weighing risks and benefits” may have substantial symbolic
purchase for some, but arguably has limitations as a way of fram-
ing responses to research of concern. Without an acknowledgment
of these, it is possible that a misplaced confidence is invested in
reviews as currently conceived and that alternative policy possibil-
ities are not sought out. Like other complex social and scientific
issues, arguably it would not be wholly unfair with respect to
the topic of this article to contend that “not only is the solution
unknown, but the problem itself is initially not well defined, and
the values that ought to drive its investigation and the valid meth-
ods to do so are unknown, unclear, or in dispute, as are the set of
applicable theoretical models, the solution set, and the criteria for
successful resolution” (124).
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In reply, this article has outlined one set of different pos-
sibilities associated with “precaution.” Though varied in their
formulations, precautionary orientations generally begin with the
aim of acknowledging conditions of uncertainty, ignorance, and
ambiguity in order to ask how issues can be sensibly approached
nevertheless. As argued, adopting such a starting basis could open
spaces for alternative ways of thinking and responding to a set of
issues that are bound to uncomfortably accompany the life sciences
into the future.
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